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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO THE
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
Leon Friedman'
Today when I left my house, I was listening to the radio.
The U.S. Attorney General, John Ashcroft, announced that the
government had arrested and indicted six people for terrorism.
Included among these suspects were four Americans. 2 I was just
about to turn off the radio when it was announced that the U.S.
Attorney in Oregon was asked, "Why didn't you put them in front
of a military commission?" I was in such a rush to get here that I
did not get the immediate answer, but I'll give you another
question.
To put this in a contemporary framework, yesterday, some
terrible person outside of Maryland killed five people.3 Suppose he
was an alien, not a U.S. citizen, and suppose further that he had
training in Al Qaeda or something, or he was training in
Afghanistan. I assume killing five people was a terrorist act.
Professor of Law, A.B., LL.B., Harvard University. Professor Friedman, a
former Associate at Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler, was Director of
the Committee for Public Justice and a Staff Attorney for the American Civil
Liberties Union. He has written the briefs for many important Supreme Court
cases dealing with issues of the First Amendment, abuse of government power,
and criminal procedure. He has also served as the Associate Director of the
Committee on Courtroom Conduct of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. Disorder in the Courts, which he wrote with Professor Norman
Dorsen of New York University, is considered the leading work on that subject.
Professor Friedman is the former General Counsel for Chelsea House Publishers
and a leading copyright lawyer. He is the author of law journal and newspaper
articles and a number of books, one of which, The Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1789-1969, received the Scribes Award as the outstanding book on a
lepal subject during 1970.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Press Conference: Portland Cell (Oct. 4,
2002). Six defendants were named by General Ashcroft and charged with
engaging in a conspiracy to join Al Qaeda and Taliban forces against the United
States. See U.S. Charges Six With Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at
Al.
3 Francis X. Clines, Random Shootings Kill Five in Washington Suburbs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at Al. Five individuals were randomly shot in the northern
suburbs of Washington D.C.. These killings have been linked to the alleged
D.C. snipers, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo. For more information, see Eric
Lichtblau & Jayson Blair, Ashcroft Decides Virginia Will Try Sniper Cases
First, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al.
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Could that type of person be tried by these famous military
commissions?4  Possibly, if he were not a U.S. citizen. While
President Bush signed a military commission order providing for
military trials for non-U.S. citizens, American citizens may not be
tried in such a forum. 5 I just raise these issues to give you the kind
of thinking that we all have to confront at this point.
Ten years ago, we experienced the first World Trade Center
bombing. 6 The bombers were tried for destruction of property and
a series of federal offenses.7 They were tried and convicted for
using weapons of mass destruction, a federal offense. 8 Each
participant received a life sentence.9 Immediately thereafter, there
were conspiracies to bomb the Lincoln Tunnel. 10 The would-be
bombers were tried in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York for conspiracy and received very
lengthy sentences." The people who bombed the embassies in
Africa were tried in the United States for killing Americans.', It is
an offense under American law to destroy American property or
conspire to kill American officials abroad. 13  So, up until last
4 A military commission is defined as "courts whose procedure and
composition are modeled upon courts-martial, being the tribunals by which
alleged violations of martial law are tried and determined. The membership of
such commissions is commonly made up of civilians and army officers. They
are probably not known outside of the United States and were first used by
General Scott during the Mexican war." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992-993
(6th ed. 1990).
5 Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
Section 2 (a) states "the term 'individual subject to this order' shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen .... "
6 The first World Trade Center bombing occurred on February 26, 1993,
killing six people and injuring more than 1,000. See Martin Gottlieb, Explosion
at Twin Towers: The Response; Size of Blast 'Destroyed' Rescue Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, Sec. 1, at 23.
7 See United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
8 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a).
9 Richard Bernstein, Trade Center Bombers Get Prison Term for 240 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at Al.
1o Rahman, 854 F. Supp. at 258.
"1 Id.
12 United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
'" 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (protection of officers and employees of the United
States); id. § 1117 (conspiracy to murder); id. § 844 (f)(1) and (0(2) (penalties
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November, we did not have any difficulty in applying our normal
criminal law to even the most destructive events in the United
States or abroad. The Oklahoma City bombing was a terrible
event. 14  What if the culprit had been a foreigner, a non-U.S.
citizen? If it happened today and the culprit was not a U.S. citizen,
would it be appropriate to put that suspect on trial before a military
commission?
I want to provide you with a point of reference to consider
these questions in light of the tragic events of September 11.15 As
a result of September 11, do we now decide that the normal legal
methods that we have for dealing with criminal acts or attacks on
our property or individuals is insufficient? Our normal criminal
procedure requires that a suspect be indicted by a grand jury of
one's peers; that you have a right to counsel; that you be found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that you receive a jury trial. Do
we now conclude that this is not good enough anymore? Do we
now conclude that additional legal weapons are needed in order to
deal with the problems that are coming up?
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a
presidential order stating that military commissions may be
convened in order to try non-U.S. citizens for acts of terrorism.'
6
There were some modifications. For instance, a conviction now
requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present. A huge
amount of attention has been devoted to the military commissions.
Attorney General Ashcroft appeared before Congress and defended
it. 17 As of today, two o'clock in the afternoon of October 4th,
2001, the commissions have yet to be utilized.
for damaging or destroying property of the Unites States by use of explosives or
fire).
"4 The Oklahoma City bombing occurred at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds. Bombing
Prosecutors to Seek Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1995, § 1, at 8.
15 From herein, September 11 will refer to the September 11, 2001 United
States terrorist attacks which include the destruction of the World Trade Center,
the attack of the Pentagon, and the crash of United Flight 93.
16 See Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 5.
17 See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (Dec. 6, 2001) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm (last visited April
16, 2003).
2002
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Moussaoui, who allegedly was the twentieth highjacker on
September 11, was charged with regular U.S. crimes.' 8 The shoe
bomber, 19 who pleaded guilty this morning, was charged only with
regular U.S. crimes. 20 So the question is: if it was not appropriate
to refer these cases to the military commission, under what
circumstances would a referral be appropriate? I suspect that the
theory was: what would we do if we actually captured Osama bin
Laden or his chief lieutenants? Would we bring him back to Foley
Square2' here in New York for a regular trial? Imagine the
security problems. Imagine all his followers coming to the
courtroom or demonstrating. I suspect the military commission
was to be an escape hatch for people of that caliber. We would try
them, but not at Foley Square. We would do what we did with
General Yamashita,22 we would try them in the Philippines, or in
Samoa, or in some American possession where we could control
the possibility of any kind of demonstration. However, I think a
lot of ink has been spilled regarding whether this would be an
appropriate legal procedure.
I want to spend a little time on the constitutional issue.
There are three, possibly four, Supreme Court precedents regarding
the use of military commissions. There is, of course, Ex parte
23Milligan. When I went to law school it was a very important
18 United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13326 (E.D. Va. July 11, 2002).
19 The shoe bomber, whose alias was Richard C. Reid, was arrested in
December of 2001 after boarding a plane from Paris bound for Miami with
explosives attached to his shoes. Warren Hoge, A Nation Challenged: The
Convert, Shoe-Bomb Suspect Fell in With Extremists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2001, at B6.
20 The federal grand jury indictment against Reid contained nine counts. They
included attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, attempted wrecking of
a mass transportation vehicle, attempted destruction of an aircraft, attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, interfering with a flight crew,
and using a destructive device during a crime of violence. David Johnston, A
Nation Challenged: The Bombing Suspect; Al Qaeda Trained Bombing Suspect,
Indictment Says, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at Al.
21 Foley Square is the location of the Federal Courthouse for the Southern
District of New York.
22 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The Court held that the military
commission which tried General Yamashita conformed with the Articles of War.
23 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
[Vol 19
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case. However, it seems to have dropped out of all the casebooks.
Milligan was a copperhead 24 and was in Indiana where he intended
to blow up a Union munitions factory.25 There was a plot to
disrupt the National Democratic Convention to be held in
26Chicago. He was a very bad guy. These events transpired during
the middle of the Civil War and it was considered a rather serious
issue. He was tried before a military commission and a writ of
habeas corpus was sworn out and the case then went to the
Supreme Court.27
There are two important issues from Ex parte Milligan.
First, the Court stated:
The Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people equally in war and in
peace and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government. 
28
Second, the Court held that martial law can never exist when the
courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction. 29 When Attorney General Ashcroft appeared before
the Senate and was asked about Milligan he stated, "Well, Milligan
is limited to its facts."30 I wonder which facts he was referring to?
There is a later precedent, and the later precedent, of
course, concerns the saboteurs who landed in Amagansett, Long
Island.3' In Ex parte Quirin, 2 there were .four saboteurs on the
24 A copperhead refers to an individual residing in the northern states during
the Civil War who sympathized with the South. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 289 (9th ed. 1986).25 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 5.
26 Id.
27Id. at 130.
28 Id. at 121.
29 Id.
30 See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 17.
31 Amagansett, New York is a Long Island town along the coast of the Atlantic
Ocean where in June of 1942, during World War II, four Nazi saboteurs came
2002
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coast of Long Island and four saboteurs in Florida, all-members of
the German Army.33 As soon as they landed, they took off their
uniforms and immediately tried to get to various metropolitan
centers. 34  Only a week after they landed, one of the saboteurs
called the police, and they were very quickly rounded up.35 One
was a United States citizen, seven were not. 36 They were tried
before a military commission where six of the defendants were
sentenced to death.37 A writ of habeas corpus was sworn out and
the case went to the Supreme Court.38 The Supreme Court denied
the writs without decision and the six were then executed.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued a decision explaining why
they declined to issue the writs. 3
9
There were a few key elements in Quirin that distinguish it
from the current potential cases. First, the United States was
engaged in a declared war, fighting the German Army. These
saboteurs were engaged in war with us and were members of the
German Army.40 The defendants never disputed that, and it was
ashore from a German submarine. Their mission was to commit sabotage in
New York City and the metropolitan area. They were' skilled in secret writing,
chemistry, and explosives. The FBI was able to apprehend all of the suspects.
See also www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/
worldwar.htm (last visited April 16, 2003) or Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
32 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
33 Id. at 21. The court stated "after the declaration of war between the United
States and the German Reich, petitioners received training at a sabotage school
near Berlin, Germany, where they were instructed in the use of explosives and in
methods of secret writing." Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 20.
37 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. The court stated,
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or
property are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.
Id.
381 Id. at 7.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 20.
[Vol 19
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never at issue. Second, the military commissions were authorized
by Congress under their constitutional grant of authority to enact
such tribunals.41 Further, the acts that the defendants were charged
with, specifically coming to the United States and planning to blow
up whatever facilities they intended to were separate from their
status as "enemy combatants. 42
Why is that important? Well, one of the cases that has
come up is the "dirty bomber," Mr. Padilla.4 3 Does anyone know
what has happened to Mr. Padilla? He was arrested. Although
Attorney General Ashcroft was in Moscow at the time of Padilla's
arrest, he held a special news conference for the express purpose of
announcing the arrest.44 Mr. Padilla, a United States citizen was
alleged to have been trained by Al Qaeda to return to the United
States and build a dirty bomb. This allegation was accredited to a
suspected Al Qaeda member. 45 Padilla was eventually taken to
New York on a material witness warrant and held for thirty days
41 Id. at 27. The court stated:
By the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C.§§ 1471-1593, Congress has
provided rules for the government of the Army. It has
provided for the trial and punishment by courts martial, of
violations of the Articles by members of the armed forces and
by specified classes of persons associated or serving with the
Army. Arts. 1, 2. But the Articles also recognize the
"military commission" appointed by military command as an
appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses
against the law of war not ordinarily tried by the court martial.
Id.
42 The Court in Quirin stated that unlawful combatants are subject to capture
and trial by military tribunals for "acts which render their belligerency
unlawful." See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27.
43 See Andrea Kannapell, Front Lines, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 4, at 2.
Jose Padilla was arrested for a terrorist plot to release a dirty bomb in the United
States. Id. Dirty bombs "are made by attaching radioactive material to a
conventional bomb to spread it over a wide area." Loius Charbonneau, IAEA
Director Warns Of 'Dirty Bomb'Risk, WASH. POST, March 12, 2003, at A15.
44 Traces of Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot To Use
Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al. Attorney General John
Ashcroft was in Moscow at a meeting with Russian officials when he announced
the arrest of Jose Padilla. Id.
45 Id. Jose Padilla had conversed with Abu Zubaydah, a captured lieutenant of
Osama bin Laden who revealed the dirty-bomb plan to United States officials.
2002
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46
under this warrant. The Department of Justice, to their credit,
recognized that they had to take some action with regard to this
"witness" they were holding. There are Supreme Court cases that
provide that persons seized are entitled to be brought before a
judge and within thirty days brought before a jury.47 The
Department of Justice was not certain how they were to handle
Padilla, so they simply transferred him to the Department of
Defense.48
While in the "custody" of the Department of Defense, they
labeled Padilla an enemy combatant and likened him to the
saboteurs that landed on Long Island, allowing them to transfer
him to a brig in Charleston, South Carolina.49  Why South
Carolina? I suspect because the Department of Defense likes the
Fourth Circuit. The Department of Defense reasons that the Fourth
Circuit will be sympathetic to its position. While various briefs
have been submitted before Judge Mukasey in the Southern
District stating "produce the body," 50 no one has heard anything
regarding Padilla for two or three months now. The question
remains under what authority is the Department of Defense
holding this "witness"?
I raise this because his status as an enemy combatant and
the accusations against him are the same thing. His case is not like
the German saboteurs. They were admitted enemy soldiers. Thus,
their status as enemy combatants and the criminal action for which
they were charged in that case, were two separate issues. In
Padilla's case the issues are neither separate nor distinct, they are
the same issue. We are not certain if Padilla is an enemy
combatant. Padilla arrived in Chicago in civilian clothes. Unless
he buried his Al Qaeda uniform when he landed in the United
46 Benjamin Weiser, Traces of Terror: The Courts; U.S. Defends Decision to
Move Suspect in 'Dirty Bomb' Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2002, at A15.
47 Gerskin v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
detention).
48 See Patricia Hurtado, Padilla's Release Demanded, SEATTLE TIMES, June
13, 2002, at A6.
49 id.
50 Habeas corpus is defined as, "a writ employed to bring a person before a
court, most frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not
illegal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
[Vol 19
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States it is difficult to analogize the facts of Quirin to Padilla's
case. Finally, consider that the defendants in Quirin were actually
indicted, unlike this Padilla fellow who is sitting in some brig in
South Carolina yet to be produced before a court. He is yet to have
any charges presented against him, and yet to have his status
actually examined by a federal court to determine whether the
actions taken against him were proper or not.5' I think the Padilla
case is the one that raises the most serious civil liberties issues.
There is also the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.52 Hamdi was
a United States citizen who was actually a member of the fighting
Afghanistan, a member of the Taliban. 53  He was taken as a
prisoner of war and he is discovered to be a United States citizen.54
He is eventually brought to Norfolk, Virginia, again within the
Fourth Circuit. While in Norfolk, somebody says "I want to be his
lawyer" or someone on his behalf, some friend says "I petition to
have a lawyer appointed., 55 The Fourth Circuit, of all circuits, said
to the Department of Justice lawyer arguing the case, 'you can just
grab someone and not have a lawyer have access to him simply on
the say so of the executive?' 56 The Court found that a troubling
proposition.
There are two other Supreme Court cases dealing
specifically with the issue of what I call constitutional limitations
on the fight against terrorism. Besides Quirin, which was decided
during World War II, there was Duncan v. Kahanamoku.57 After
Pearl Harbor, the United States declared martial law in Hawaii, and
for two or three years thereafter, the civilian courts did not
operate. 58 If you broke into a store or robbed a bank or beat up on
someone, you were not tried by a United States court, you
51 See Benjamin Weiser, supra note 46.
52 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002). The court reversed an order mandating access
to counsel for an alleged enemy combatant.
3 Id. at 279.541 Id. at 280.
" Id. at 283.
56 Id. at 284.
57 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
51 Id. at 307-09.
2002
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appeared before a military commission. 59 Was that permissible
under the Constitution? While Duncan had been found guilty of
assault in the military commission, on a writ of habeas corpus to
the Supreme Court, the Court stated that it was not permissible to
try the defendant in the military commission. In Duncan, the
Supreme Court stated:
Military trials of a civilian charged with a crime,
especially when not made subject to judicial review,
are so obviously contrary to our political traditions
and our institution of jury trials in courts of law,
that the tenuous circumstance offered by the
Government can hardly suffice to persuade us that
Congress was willing to enact a Hawaiian supreme
court decision permitting such a radical departure
from our steadfast beliefs.6'
The tenuous circumstances were the attack on Pearl Harbor and the
fact that Hawaii was a territory rather than a state. These,
according to the Court, were not enough to justify removing the
civilian courts and making every crime in Hawaii subject to
military control.62
Next, there was In re Yamashita.63  Yamashita was the
Japanese general in the Philippines who was charged with failing
to control his forces and allowing them to commit various
atrocities against United States soldiers as well as the civilian
population. A military commission tried him.65 The Supreme
Court upheld his military trial over two very strong dissents by
Justices Murphy and Rutledge.66  The Court reasoned that the
59 While at the time, Hawaii was a territory of the United States, and not a
state, the citizens enjoyed all of the benefits of the United States Constitution,
including jury trials.
60 Duncan, 372 U.S. at 324.
61 Id. at 317.
62 d. at 324.
63 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
64Id. at 14.6 1Id. at 10.
66 Id. at 25 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
[Vol 19
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actions taken by the general constituted a violation of the law of
war.
67
Certainly, atrocities against civilians, at the time and to this
day, are in violation of the law of war. 68 In addition, military
personnel are themselves responsible for actions they take as well
as for the actions taken by personnel in their charge.69 Thus, the
Supreme Court upheld Yamashita's conviction since he was a
foreigner and was certainly part of the military.70 The Yamashita
case certainly bears close resemblance to the Norfolk trials,
71
which involves international acts, acts not committed in the United
States. These are the four precedents relied on in the current
situation. It is my opinion that one cannot glean much from these
four cases.
There is, however, something that we can take from the
Quirin case. It does establish the proposition that there is such a
thing as an enemy combatant. 72 If a defendant is an "enemy
combatant," the rights afforded under the Constitution do not
67Id. at 15.
68 Following the Second World War, the law of war was codified in the four
Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3 (1), 6 U.S.T. 3516, states
in pertinent part,
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities.. .shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth
or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
69 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 16.
70 Id. at 13.
71 See Hamdi, 296 F.3d 278; see also supra discussion accompanying notes
52-56.
7, Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
2002
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apply.73  Thus, such a defendant cannot rely on the protection of
the Constitution when such a defendant faces criminal charges.
74
Notice that both Attorney General Ashcroft, as well as Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, attempt to invoke those magic words, "enemy
combatant., 75  Thus, the question becomes; under what
circumstances can one properly label a defendant an "enemy
combatant"? For once such a label is applied, then, presumably it
would be appropriate to hand off the defendant to the military.
Once in custody of the military, the defendant may be placed in a
brig in Charleston, South Carolina, without benefit of appearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction to await "trial" before a
military commission.
There is of course a legitimate law of war. Moreover, there
are treaties to which this country is aparty, with one of the treaties
being the 1949 Geneva Convention. It provides that a prisoner of
war is subject to the protections of the Geneva Convention if he is
a lawful combatant. Attorney General Ashcroft stated in his
testimony before the Senate that the tragic events of September 11,
and the destruction of The World Trade Center were acts of war.
7 8
Therefore, the Attorney General concluded the law of war is
applicable. 79 The problem with the Attorney General's conclusion
is found in the Geneva Convention itself. The Geneva Convention
73 d. at 40.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 31. An enemy combatant is generally one who, without being a
member of a government's army, wages war by destruction of life or property.
Id.
76 The Geneva Conventions were established by sixty-three governments in
1949. The provisions provide for the protection of members of armed forces in
the field and at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians in the internal territory of a
hostile nation and in any occupied territory. The Geneva Conventions include:
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War; and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War.
77 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 4(A), 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
78 See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 17.
79 id.
[Vol 19
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only recognizes combatants provided the person is part of a regular
military organization.80 Further, the Convention considers one a
lawful combatant provided the individual is under responsible
military control while wearing an insignia viewable at a distance.
8 1
This presents a difficult question regarding those members of Al
Qaeda or even the Taliban. 2 Were they lawful prisoners of war
recognized as such under the Geneva Convention? Did they wear
insignia viewable at a distance? Were they under responsible
military control?
The Geneva Convention states that if there is any doubt as
to an individual's status, as either a "lawful prisoner of war" or
"unlawful prisoner of war," then such status must be determined
by an independent tribunal.8 3 Those that capture prisoners are not
in a position to declare such prisoners unlawful combatants in
order to avoid providing the protections afforded under the Geneva
Convention. The protections afforded under the Convention
include that a prisoner be properly fed, cared for and most
importantly, that when hostilities are concluded he is released.
84
There is an inherent difficulty in dealing with terrorism as
compared to actual war. Usually, in the case of war it is possible
to determine when the war has concluded. However, in the case of
terrorism, how does one know that it is over? I consider the war
on terrorism as a somewhat fuzzy or quasi-war. International
treaties are for the most part useless, for their applicability is to
actual conflicts and not the type of war we are engaged in. Under
this scenario, we continue to prosecute so-called regular criminal
cases against regular criminals. For example, defendants who
blow up buildings are tried via the normal criminal process. For
the most part, we have done very well convicting and imprisoning
such defendants. Next, we have the Geneva Convention and the
law of war that we use to prosecute legal combatants and this
system seems to be adequate in its operation. However, we now
have created this "middle ground."
80 Geneva Convention, art. 4 (A), 6 U.S.T. at 3316.
81 Geneva Convention, art. 4 (A)(2)(b), 6 U.S.T. at 3316.
82 The author notes that Al Qaeda may or may not be synonymous with the
Taliban.
83 Geneva Convention, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3316.
" Geneva Convention, art 13-16, 25-32, and 188, 6 U.S.T. at 3316.
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If you are an unlawful combatant, then you do not have the
protection of the Geneva Convention and additionally do not have
the protection of the United States Constitution. We can stick you
in a brig in Charleston as long as we want and stick you in front of
a military commission if we want. I think this is sort of
problematic. Who decides whether such prisoners are unlawful
combatants?
In the John Walker Lindh case, 85 Lindh pleaded guilty, but
his lawyer claimed Lindh was a lawful combatant. 86 It cuts two
ways. If you are a lawful combatant and shoot someone, you are
not guilty of murder. However, if you are an unlawful combatant
and you shoot someone, then you are guilty of murder. Hence, the
law of war is protective in some respects. Among other things,
Lindh's lawyer argued that his client was a soldier. If the court
were to accept such an argument, Lindh would have the defense of
lawful combatant.8 8 In my opinion, such an argument would have
been very weak, and his lawyers must have agreed, for Lindh
pleaded guilty.89
The District Court judge, citing a book about the Taliban,9 °
held Lindh was not a lawful combatant. 9' The Judge relied on the
fact that Lindh was a member of the foreign fighters of the
Taliban, a group that was not under responsible military control.
92
At least in this case, there was an effort to deal with this issue. At
least the district court judge considered the question as to the
defendant's status.
Another major issue is the war on drugs. The effect of drug
use is devastating on this nation. Many of the drugs used in this
country originate in foreign countries, among them Columbia and
85 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
86 Id. at 545.
87 Id. at 552.
88 Id.
89 United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Va. 2002).
90 KAMAL MATINUDDIN, THE TALIBAN PHENOMENON: AFGHANISTAN 1994-97
59 (Oxford University Press 1999).
9' Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
92 id.
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Afghanistan. 93 We have declared war on drugs and we have
appointed a general whose job it is to coordinate that war.94 Are
we now going to say that the drug epidemic has reached such a
proportion that, from now on, any drug kingpin is considered an
unlawful combatant in the war on drugs? If we can make such a
declaration, can we then try such a defendant in a military
commission and not in a regular court? It makes people a little
nervous in using metaphors such as "we are at war."
There is no question we have foreigners trying to do
damage to the United States. Is it acceptable to say "we are at
war" because we face this problem? For, if that is the case, then
we can term these new culprits "unlawful combatants" and we can
treat them as we treated the saboteurs who landed on Long Island
in the Quirin case. My position is, our regular criminal law has
handled these defendants quite well so far. If we are worried about
secret government information, we have something called the
Classified Information Procedures Act.95 The Act allows a federal
court to impose various kinds of restrictions on disclosure of
classified information. 96  The Classified Information Procedures
Act97 has been applied in a number of different cases. In my
opinion, our normal criminal law procedures are very effective in
dealing with all these terrible people who deserve the most severe
punishment, but it all should be done in conformity with the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court took one case which will be heard this
year that has to do with aliens and immigration.98 Under the USA
Patriot Act,99 if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to
believe that an alien is engaged in terrorist activity, the alien may
93 See U.S. Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report 2001, available at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/ (last
visited April 16, 2003).
" John P. Walters, Director of National Drug Control Policy.
9' 18 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 1-16 (2003).
96 18 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 3-4.
97 18 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 1-16 (2003).
98 Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Demore v.
Kim, 122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002).
99 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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be taken into custody for seven days. 100 If you are a United States
citizen and there are reasonable grounds to believe you have
committed a crime, the only option the government has is to stop
you for twenty minutes and pat you down for a weapon. 10 ' That is
the holding in Terry v. Ohio.
10 2
However, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that an
alien is engaged in terrorist activity or any other activity
endangering the national security, the government can hold the
alien for seven days before affording the alien an opportunity to
appear before a judge. 0 3 At that point, deportation proceedings
may be started.
The 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act, IIRIRA, °4 provides that once an alien is taken in for a
deportable offense, there is no bail. 10 5 The Ninth Circuit in Kim v.• 106
Zig/ar stated that you cannot apply this standard to a permanent
resident alien unless there is some very special reason to believe he
will flee or cause injury to the community. 10 7 Therefore, with
regard to this very broad restriction on aliens, there are two laws.
There is the IIRIRA, which provides for no bail, and there is the
Patriot Act, 08 which provides for seven days detention based on
reasonable grounds. The Patriot Act'0 9 is yet to be tested in the
courts. The Supreme Court, the very last day of the term, granted
certiorari in the case of Demore v. Kim," and that is the one
national security case they have taken so far.
Another immigration issue is the question of whether secret
proceedings can be held. There have been approximately four or
'0o Id. § 412.
'l' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968).
102 Id.
103 USA Patriot Act § 412.
'04 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 et seq. (2000))
'o' 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
106 276 F.3d 523.
I7 id.
'08 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
109 Id.
10 122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002) (granting of certiorari).
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five court decisions on the issue."' There was a decision in the
District of Columbia by federal Judge Gladys Kessler, in Center
for National Security Studies v. United States Department of
Justice.1 12  In this case, various news organizations and the
American Civil Liberties Union asked for information regarding
detained aliens.'1 3 Immediately after September 11, there were
approximately 1,182 aliens picked up. 1 4 The question that looms
is, what is the status of these aliens? More importantly, what is the
basis for their arrest?
In August 2002, Judge Kessler ordered the government to
disclose information relating to the detainees and their status.
15
None of the detainees were held on terrorist charges: some were
held on deportable offenses, 116 others were held on other criminal
charges,' 17 and some were held on material witness warrants." 8
Some of the people picked up were ordered deported." 9
Here the questions we ask are, are these deportation proceedings
open or closed? Can the press or the public have access to those
deportation proceedings? Both the Third Circuit and the Sixth
Circuit have held that they are open proceedings.' 20  The Third
Circuit ordered that all immigration proceedings must be open.
12 1
The very last day of the term of the Supreme Court, a stay was
requested and granted on that order. 122
... Ctr. for Nat'l. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D.D.C. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (6th Cir.
2002); N. Jersey Med. Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002);
Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Welsh v. Ashcroft,
293 F.3d 213 (4th Cir 2002).
t"2 215 F. Supp. 2d at 94.
". Id. at 97.
"4 Ctr. For Nat'l. Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 99 n.7.
"' Id. at 100.
116 Id. at 98.
117 ]d.
118Id.
119 Ctr. For Nat'l. Sec. Studies, F. Supp. 2d at 98 n.4.
120 Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937; N. Jersey Med. Group, 308 F.3d
198.
121 N. Jersey Med. Group, 308 F.3d 198.
122 id.
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The Sixth Circuit applied only a single case, the Hamdi
case, 23 and did not generally open up all immigration cases. In
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that these
cases must be open to keep 'said democracy. ' 24 The Court said
that a true democracy is one that operates on faith - faith that
government officials are forthcoming and honest, and faith that
informed citizens will arrive at logical conclusions.
125
In the immigration field, we have several important issues.
We have the 'no bail provision, ' 26 and the open immigration
proceedings. 27 Whether or not immigration proceedings should
be open will be decided in the future by the Supreme Court.
The last issue that I will discuss is the conflict surrounding
material witness warrants. I mentioned that several of the people
picked up after September 11, particularly immigrants, are being
held on material witness warrants.128 There has been a major clash
in the Southern District of New York about whether the material
witness detention provision applies to a grand jury proceeding. 129
Oftentimes an immigrant is necessary for trial. Afraid that
the immigrants will run away, the government issues a warrant for
their arrest. This warrant is not issued because the immigrant
committed any crime. It is to make sure that he is available at the
trial, and when the trial is over the immigrant is free to go. The
question that remains is, can you apply the material witness
provision to a grand jury witness? The answer to this question is
complicated. If you look at section 3144,130 it appears from an
affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material
.23 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
124 Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937.
121 ld. at 944.
126 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c).
121 See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
128 Material witness warrant ensures the attendance at trial of a government
witness.
129 See United States v. Awaddalan, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that Section 3144 does not apply to a material witness before a grand
jury). But see In re Application of the U.S. for a Material Witness Warrant,
2002 WL 1592739 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that Section 3144 does apply to a
material witness before a grand jury).
130 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (regarding release or detention of a material
witness).
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in a criminal proceeding then that person may be held as a witness
for the later proceeding.131
At the grand jury stage, you do not have parties. Instead,
you have the United States subpoenaing someone. Judge
Scheindlin, in United States v. Awaddalah,32 held that section
3144 does not apply to material witnesses before a grand jury
because the wording of the statute seems to encompass an already
filed indictment. 33 Judge Scheindlin was also concerned as to
what is material to a grand jury.' 34 Because you do not have an
indictment, you do not have the frame work within which to decide
whether something is material or not.'
35
Judge Scheindlin held the material witness provision does
not apply to witnesses before the grand jury. 36 Judge Mukasey,
also from the Southern District, is the federal judge who has the
habeas corpus federal extradition for Jose Padilla.' 37 Mukasey
held that the material witness provision does apply.'38 It will be
interesting to see how the Supreme Court decides on this matter.
Thank you for your time.
QUESTIONS
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What is going to happen with Jose
Padilla?
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: I think that the government is going to
have to produce him. They do have evidence for him, but for one
reason or another, they do not want to use that evidence in a
regular criminal proceeding. They would never have picked him
up without some evidence. I think, eventually, they are going to
have to bring him before a federal court and present the charges. I
do not know how you can keep him there indefinitely with no
charges being brought.
131 Id.
132 202 F. Supp. 2d 55.
133 Id. at 62.
134 Id. at 62-63.
135 Id. at 63.
136 Id. at 64.
137 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
131 Id. at 569-70.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Was the military commission order really
more of an intelligence gathering effort rather than [a forum] to
actually try people for crimes?
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: I just do not see why you need the
military commission questioning these people for a very long time.
Presumably, we got some very useful information. Why do we
need the threat of a military commission in order to get that
information? We have in our possession whatever information we
are trying to get out of them. I am sure that may be part of it, but I
do not see why the actual military commission is a necessary part
of the intelligence gathering effort.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you see the Lynne Stewart case as
fitting into part of the picture you describe here or do you see it
being something completely different or an aberration?
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: Lynne Stewart was a local New York
lawyer. 139 I think the Lynne Stewart case was an effort to bolster
the theory that lawyers can transmit security information. We
want to be sure they do not. Stewart was talking to Sheik
Rahman.140 There was some information that he wanted made
public and she made it public. The Clinton Justice Department
informed her and told her she should not do this any longer.' 4 1
When the new administration came in she did transmit some
139 MS. Stewart, an attorney with offices in Manhattan, was indicted on charges
of terrorism along with three other co-defendants. She was indicted for
conspiring to provide material support or resources to designated foreign
terrorist organizations, providing such support and resources, conspiring to
defraud the United States, and making false statements to federal officers. See
United States v. Sattar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2002).
140 Ms. Stewart was an attorney working for Sheik Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel
Rahman, who was convicted along with other defendants of various offenses in
connection with an urban terrorist plot to bomb the World Trade Center, bridges
and tunnels in New York City, and plotting to murder various public figures.
See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999). Ms. Stewart is
accused of visiting Rahman in prison to further some of the criminal activity
alleged in her indictment. See Sattar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798 at *4.
14' See Susie Day, Inside the Mind of a (Confused) Terrorist Lawyer,
FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE.COM, Nov. 25, 2002, at http://www.frontpage
mag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=4764 (last visited April 16, 2003).
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information that Rahman wanted. The government said this could
be dangerous and therefore, she should not do that. She was
indicted for violating Justice Department regulations. 142
142 See Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft: Islamic Group
Indictment / SAMs (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
speeches/2002/040902agpreparedremarksislamicgroupindictments.htm (last
visited April 16, 2003); see also Sattar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798.
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